The precise sequence of events that led to Russia's intervention has not yet been clarified, but the fact remains that there is a larger game being played here.

With the enlargement of Nato to include countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the Baltic states which were once part of the Soviet Union, and its military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo leading to the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, the West has ignored Russia's protestations and ridden roughshod over what Russia perceives to be its national security interests.

Even more alarmingly, with the "colour revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and the deployment of US forces in Central Asia, Western, influence seemed to be spreading inexorably into Russia's sphere of influence.

Having supported Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatism in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been satisfied to accept the status quo in the region until now. Since 2002, the United States has been training Georgian armed forces in counter-terrorism and developed close co-operation with the Georgian military.

As Ukraine and Georgia moved closer towards the path to Nato membership, Russia took action to put down a marker that it was no longer prepared to tolerate Western encroachment. Having been humiliated by its inability to counter Western actions against Serbia and the recognition of Kosovo, it is now basking in the demonstration of apparent Western impotence.

However Russia's current triumphalism hides the weaknesses of its position. There is no question that the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and Georgia, as well as some of Russia's military actions, contravene international law and will be opposed by most countries.

Moreover, it defies the conditions of the ceasefire which was signed by the Russian government itself. It also contradicts Russia's previous stance in favour of territorial integrity and against secession.

Whatever charges might be levelled at the Georgian government, they pale into insignificance compared with Russia's actions in Chechnya to defeat separatism.

Finally, it is unclear whether Abkhazia and South Ossetia are viable as independent states and especially South Ossetia will be wholly dependent on Russian support.

Western responses to this situation require a proper sense of proportion and patience.

Talk of a New Cold War is inappropriate. This is not to deny that a fundamental systemic conflict between Russia and the West has finally come to a head.

There is more than a little irony in the fact that Russia, in consolidating its grip on the former Soviet space with tanks and artillery, is using similar arguments that were used to justify Nato's intervention in Kosovo.

Other states in the region, especially Ukraine, are getting jittery. This is why David Miliband went to Kiev to rally support for a united front to oppose "Russian aggression".

It is clear that Russia's relations with the West are going to go through a turbulent period as co-operation between Russia and Nato will essentially be frozen, Russia's membership in the World Trade Organisation is postponed to the indefinite future and a new political
co-operation agreement with the EU may also become a victim of the new downturn in relations.

Russia is already beginning to pay a price as its efforts to persuade Poland not to agree to the stationing of radars and interceptors as part of a US missile defence system finally failed. Its actions in Georgia were enough to push a prevaricating Polish government over the edge, and thereby defeated one of Russia's most important strategic goals in Europe.

Moreover, Russia will not ultimately be able to prevent Ukraine's membership in Nato and its actions may have hastened such a development. But there are limits to this new confrontation between Russia and the West.

Russia is far more integrated into the world economy than the Soviet Union ever was. While Europe is dependent on Russian gas and oil, without its earnings from energy exports the Russian economy would not be viable.

Nobody will want to go back to the strategic nuclear confrontation of the Cold War; quite the reverse, US-Russian co-operation on nuclear safety will continue. Russia, and
more importantly, Russia's political and financial elite,
has nothing to gain from returning to a state of complete international isolation.

For this reason, it is important to avoid the rhetoric of confrontation or triumphalism. The goal must be to encourage political and economic reform in the newly independent states including Russia and their continued integration into the international community.

This is a long-term objective that Western statesmen must not lose sight of as they unite in their response to Russia's actions in the Caucasus.


Christoph Bluth is Professor of International Studies at Leeds University.